Florida v. Jardines 569 US ___ (2013), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court stating that police using detection dogs trained to sniff narcotics front porch private homes is a "search" in the sense of the Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution States, and therefore, without consent, require possible causes and search warrants.
In 2006, police in Miami, Florida received an anonymous tip that a home used as a home grown marijuana. They lead police dogs sniffing drugs into the front door of the house, and the dog is alerting the front door to the smell of contraband. A search warrant was issued, which led to the arrest of the homeowner.
Twenty-seven US states and the Federal government, among others, support the Florida argument that the use of police dogs is an acceptable form of unsecured search without risk. In the 5-4 decision, the Court disagreed, although three previous cases where the Court had ruled that the dog sniff was not searches when placed against baggage at the airport, against vehicles in the prohibition of illegal drugs. checkpoints, and against vehicles during routine traffic stops. The court made clear by this ruling that they considered the placement of police dogs at the front door of private residences to be another matter altogether.
Video Florida v. Jardines
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On November 3, 2006, anonymous and unverified tip was given to the Miami-Dade Police Department through the tip of his "crime-stop", indicating that the home of Joelis Jardines was used as a home for growing marijuana. About a month later, on December 6, 2006, two detectives and a drug-detection dog approached the residence, while another officer from the Miami-Dade Police Department established a perimeter position around the residence, with agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in a standby position as backup unit.
As summarized by the written opinion of the Third District District Court of Florida:
... the detective went to the house at 7 am. He watched the house for fifteen minutes. There was no vehicle in the driveway, the curtains were closed, and no activity could be observed.
After fifteen minutes, the dog steward arrives with a dog that detects drugs. The handler places the dog on a leash and accompanies the dog to the front door of the house. The dog was alert to the smell of contraband.
The handler tells the detective that the dog has a positive warning for the smell of narcotics. The detective went to the front door for the first time, and smelled marijuana.... The detective prepared a statement and filed a search warrant, issued. The search was done, which confirmed that marijuana was being planted inside the house. The defendant was arrested.
While Miami-Dade's drug detectives are far from the scene to secure a search warrant, the Federal DEA agent stays behind to guard Jardines's home surveillance. The search warrant was secured about an hour later, and was executed by officers from both agencies. The defendant was arrested by the DEA agent as he attempted to escape through the back door of the residence.
Maps Florida v. Jardines
Lower court
Initially, the court adjudicated the accused's movement to suppress evidence obtained from his home, citing the authority of Florida State v. Rabb . The state appealed that the decision to press, and the Florida District District Third District (DCA) reversed, while certifying the conflict with the previous Rabb decision. Summarizing their reasons, the DCA states:
We do it because, first, the dog sniff is not the Fourth Amendment quest; second, officers and dogs are legally present at the door of the defendant; and thirdly, the confiscated evidence will surely be found.
The foundation for the principle that "sniffing dogs is not the Fourth Amendment Search" comes from a case of sniffing the Supreme Court dog beforehand, discussed below, and located in the heart of instant cases and some other similar cases.
Jardines are looking for a review at the Supreme Court of Florida, based on a conflict of Rabb . In a 5-2 decision given on April 14, 2011, Florida Supreme Court favored the Jardines, saying:
"We have said that the Fourth Amendment drew 'a firm line at the entrance to the house." The line, in our opinion, should be not only assertive but also bright - requiring a clear specification of the surveillance method that requires a warrant. "Given the special status of a citizen's home in Anglo-American jurisprudence, we argue that unsecured" sniffing "tests conducted at the residential front door in this case are unreasonable government interference into the sanctity of the house and violate the Fourth Amendment We canceled the decision at Jarden and approved the results on Rabb .
The state filed a motion for rehearing, which was rejected by the Florida Supreme Court on July 7, 2011.
Case sniffing of previous dog
In his written opinion, the Florida Supreme Court referred and analyzed only three cases of sniffing dogs that the US Supreme Court has heard to date. First, United States v. Place (1983), the Court answered the question of whether the police, on reasonable suspicion, could temporarily seize a piece of goods at the airport and then hand over his belongings to a sniff test by a dog detecting drugs. After the defendant's behavior at an airport drew suspicion, the police confiscated his belongings and delayed him to a sniff test by a drug-detecting dog while he was traveling through another airport, and eventually found cocaine inside. The Supreme Court concluded that the seizure, which lasted ninety minutes, was Terry's long term discharge, but with regard to sniffing dogs, the Court said that:
[A] sniffing dogs... no need to open luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that would otherwise remain hidden from public view, just as, for example, an officer was churning out the contents of the suitcase. Thus, the way... is much less than a regular search. In addition, the sniff only reveals the presence or absence of narcotics, contra-band items.... This limited disclosure also ensures that property owners do not experience the embarrassment and inconvenience caused in less discriminatory and more disruptive investigation methods. In this case, the sniff dog is sui generis . We are aware of no other very limited investigative procedures either in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information disclosed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that... the exposure of respondents' luggage, located in public places, to trained dogs - is not a "search" in the sense of Fourth Amendment. (emphasis added)
Next, in The City of Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000), the Supreme Court answered the question of whether the police could stop the vehicle at a finger-style drug-checking post and subdue any vehicle to a sniff test around the exterior of the vehicle by a dog detecting drugs. The court ruled that the vehicle checkpoint itself was not allowed seizures , but whether dog sniffing was search , however, the Court again stated that:
The fact that officers carry a narcotic surveillance dog around the outside of every car at an Indianapolis checkpoint does not change the foreclosure into a search.
In the third case, Illinois v. Caballes (2005), the Supreme Court ruled that a small dog sniff without permission to sniff the vehicle is allowed in traffic routinely stops. The Caballes Court says that:
Dog sniffing done during allowed traffic stops that do not disclose information other than the location of a substance not owned by any individual does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
This conclusion, which reinforces the constitutionality of certain unsecured searches, is based on the premise that:
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- such vehicles are already deprived legally, even temporarily, during traffic halt;
- the police never got in the car;
- both vehicles and police are on public property when they do dog sniffs;
Consistent with the previous decision, the Court once again declares that a person does not have reasonable expectations of privacy while in a public property, and that the dog sniffs, becomes sui generis only discloses information about contraband that no one has.
Other relevant cases
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed two additional US Supreme Court cases regarding instant instances, the first of which was the United States v. Jacobsen (1984). At Jacobsen , the Supreme Court answered the question of whether the police could seize and inspect a package without a possible cause, having been damaged in transit and having a white powder spilled out of it. Using a small amount of powder for the field test for cocaine, the results were positive. Again, it is considered not to be a search under Fourth Changes:
Congress has decided... to treat the "private" interests of having cocaine as illegitimate; so the behavior of the government that can reveal whether a substance is a cocaine, and no other "personal" fact that can be denied, does not compromise with legitimate privacy interests.... Here, as in Place , it is likely that the official action of the type disclosed by the recording will actually harm the legitimate privacy interest seems too far away to characterize the test as the search subject on the Fourth Amendment.
Other related cases are Kyllo v. United States (2001). At Kyllo , police have used thermal imaging devices from a public point of view to monitor the heat radiation from one's home - allowing them to identify the heat signatures of the lights used in growing home grown cannabis operations. The Court believes that the use of this "advanced technology" to study personal details about the inside of a person's home without an unconstitutional warrant. The Court's Decision on Caballes several years later was questioned on certain aspects of Kyllo, but Judge Stevens distinguished Caballes from Kyllo i> in this section:
Very important for Kyllo's decision is the fact that the device is capable of detecting legitimate activity - in that case, intimate details at home, such as "what time each night the lady from home takes her sauna and bath daily." The legitimate expectation that information on fully legitimate activities will remain private can be distinguished from the expectations or expectations of the respondents regarding the contraband in the trunk of his car. Dog sniffing done during allowed traffic stops that do not disclose information other than the location of a substance not owned by any individual does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Sniffing dog in private residence
In his analysis of the above cases, the Florida Supreme Court drew a clear distinction regarding the dog-sniffing tests performed on vehicles, but on private residences:
Significantly, all sniffs and field trials in the above cases were carried out by minimally interfering with objects at the airport at Places , roadside vehicles in Edmond and < i> Caballes , and transit packages at Jacobsen - which ensures no special protection under the Fourth Amendment. All tests are conducted in an impersonal manner that subjects defendants to undesirable levels of public humiliation, humiliation or shame.... More and, more importantly, under the special circumstances of each of the above cases, tests are not vulnerable to employment discriminatively or arbitrarily... and there is no evidence of arrogant or abusive government behavior. No protection required for Fourth Amendment. As explained below, however, it is not the case with the "sniff" dogs performed in private residences....
Although police can generally start "knock and talk" meetings at the front door of private residence without showing any mistakes before,... "dog sniffing tests" is a qualitatively different matter. Contrary to popular belief, a "sniffing test" done at a private residence is not always an ordinary matter in which dog and dog officers approach the front door and the dog then performs a fine "sniff test" and gives a "warning" signal if medication is detected. Quite the opposite. In this case, for example,... "The sniff test" conducted by the dog and dog board is a powerful and intensive procedure....
As public spectacle takes place in a residential neighborhood will always create a level of public oppression, humiliation and embarrassment for the population, whether he is present at the time of the search, for dramatic government activities in the eyes of many people - passengers, passers-by, and the wider community - will be seen as an official criminal allegation.... Furthermore, all of the underlying circumstances that exist in the case of dog "sniffing dog" and "federal field test" above that assure the purpose, the uniform application of the tests... are not in "unsupecified" sniff testing performed in private residence. Unlike objects in such cases, private residences are not vulnerable to prior confiscation based on objective criteria. So, if a government agency can do a dog "sniff" test at a private residence without previous evidence indicating an error, there is not enough to prevent the agent from improperly or discriminatoryly implementing the procedure, or based on will and luxury, at the home of every citizen.
In a separate agreement, joining two judges from Florida Supreme Court, Judge Lewis went further:
We as Americans have an unshakable hope that there will be no one, or something, that sniffs every crevice, a gap, a window, or a chimney in our house. We especially do not expect strangers to take dogs to or to our private front porch to sniff under our front door or the crevices or crevices of our house. The protected interests of privacy expectations will be eliminated if an individual, who manipulates animals, is allowed to make a final decision as to whether the government should enter into a private residence based on an anonymous, unrecognized, and unrecognized tip. Sanctioning and agreeing to change the "dogs" in Florida homes is the antithesis of personal freedom of ownership and privacy expectation as we know and conflict with who we are as free people.
AS. Supreme Court
Questions are presented
On October 26, 2011, Florida petitioned the US Supreme Court for a certiorari statement, dated 6 January 2012. The petition covers the following legal questions:
- I. Is the dog sniffing at the door of the house allegedly grown by a trained narcotics detective is the Fourth Amendment search that needs a possible cause?
- II. Did the officer's behavior during the home investigation grow, including the remaining outdoors waiting for the search warrant, itself, the Fourth Amendment search?
The Supreme Court provides certiorari, but with a limited scope only to Question I as presented in the petition.
Amicus curiae
Summary of amicus curiae is submitted to support the applicant with:
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- United States
- Texas, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota , Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin
- National Dog Police Association and K-9 Police Magazine
- Wayne County, Michigan
Summary to support respondents submitted by:
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- Rutherford Institute
- Cato Institute
- Fourth Amendment Scholar (52 college law professors)
- National Criminal Defense Lawyers' Association, et al.
Arguments
In any case sniffing the previous Supreme Court dog, the Court's core belief that dog sniffing is sui generis and only able to detect smuggled substances has become the basis for concluding that dog sniffing is not a 'search 'in the sense of the Fourth Amendment. This basic assumption remains largely unmatched in the above mentioned "sniff dog" cases. One Amicus briefly directly challenges this assumption, indicating that:
Scientific research now establishes that dogs that detect drugs are not aware of the contraband itself. Instead, dogs that detect drugs remind them of certain volatile substances - in general, illegal drug products are damaged. This decomposition odor constituent is not at all illegal or even unique to contraband. In fact, these volatile molecules or compounds are also found in large quantities in ordinary household items. Therefore, rather than detecting the contraband itself, the warning of detection dogs against completely legal molecules or compounds actually yields the conclusion that contraband is also present . Because the technique of sniffing the canines depends on detecting molecules and nonkontraband compounds in the home as a basis for concluding that contraband is hidden inside, the dog's drug detection device "is capable of detecting legitimate activity" within the home. Scientific research establishes that instead of smelling cocaine, the drug-detecting dogs are wary of methyl benzoate - the odor propagated by snapdragons, petunias, perfumes and food additives. Instead of kissing heroin, the drug-detecting dogs are wary of acetic acid - the odor propagated by vinegar and aspirin past its heyday. Instead of smelling MDMA ("Ecstasy"), the drug-detecting dogs are wary of piperonal - odors distributed with soap, perfumes, food additives, and even flea-proofing. (excerpt removed)
In their appellant statement, the State of Florida argues that the lower court incorrectly relies on Kyllo and mistakenly identifies dogs sniffing by search, in which case:
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- there is no physical breakdown or entry to the residence, and the police have the right to approach the front door of the house to "knock and talk" with the owner;
- "While a dog who detects a drug can smell a different smell coming from a source, it will say only one thing: whether the drug is present... and it does not reveal personal facts in the process ";/li>
- the dog is not a "device", nor is it a rapid "technological advance" associated with Kyllo Court;
- "This court repeatedly spies on a dog is not a Fourth Amendment quest".
The oral argument was heard on October 31, 2012. This case was heard on the same day as another "sniff dog" case, Florida v. Harris . The case focuses on whether a law enforcement assertion that the dog is "trained" or "certified" is sufficient to establish the probable cause for the search. The decision at Harris has been inherited more than a month before that Jardines .
Decision
On March 26, 2013, by a margin of 5-4, the Supreme Court declared that the use of government-trained police dogs to investigate houses and surrounding areas was a "search" in the Fourth Amendment sense, thus affirming the Florida Supreme Court.
Judge Scalia wrote the majority opinion, joining Judge Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Judge Kagan also submitted an opinion agreeing, joining Judge Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Judge Alito wrote a different opinion, joining Judge Agung Roberts and Judge Kennedy and Breyer.
In this case, the Court does not share the "typical" liberal-conservative ideology. The conservative judges were evenly split, with Supreme Court Justice Scalia and Thomas joining three of the four liberal judges in the majority. Likewise, the liberal Justice Authority and Kennedy Justice - often "swing voices" in the cases prescribed along the strict ideological line - join the minority in dissent.
Majority opinion
The majority opinion of Judge Scalia, who joined Judges Kagan, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor, did not focus on the right to privacy implied by most of the modern Fourth Amendment cases. Instead, the decision depends on the property of the citizen. This follows the 2012 precedent of the United States v. Jones, that when the police physically harass people, homes, papers, or securities for the purpose of obtaining information, "a 'search' in the original sense of the Fourth Amendment" has "no doubt occurred." This conclusion is consistent with jurisprudence The Fourth Amendment of the first Court, which until the second half of the 20th century is bound to violations under general law. In the Fourth Amendment the "core", the Court said, stood "the right of a man to withdraw to his own home and be free from unreasonable government disturbances."
Scalia cites precedents as far back as 1765, from Entick v. Carrington , a case in front of the English Court of the King of King, quotes, "[O] ur law holds the property of every human being so sacred, that no man can set foot near his neighbor without permission." He goes on to say:
We therefore regard the area as "immediately surrounded and connected to the home" - what our case refers to as "cage" - as "part of the house itself for the purpose of Fourth Amendment."... The principle has ancient and durable roots. Just as the difference between a home and an open field is "as old as common law,"... so is the identity of the house and what Blackstone calls "curtilage or homestall," because "the house protects and privileges all its branches and applications."... The area around the house is "closely related to the house, both physically and psychologically," and is the "highest privacy hope."
The court acknowledges that the doorbell or knocker is usually treated as an invitation, or license, to the public to approach the front door of the house to send letters, sell goods, solicit donations, etc. This license extends to the police, who have the right to try to involve a resident in a "knock and talk" for the purpose of collecting evidence without a warrant. However:
This implicit license usually allows visitors to approach the house by the front, tap quickly, wait a while to be received, and then (no invitation to linger) away. Adhering to the provisions of the traditional invitation does not require complicated legal knowledge; this is generally managed without incident by Scout and Nation's Nation tricks-or-treaters.
Scalia uses the analogy of a "visitor scouring the road ahead with a metal detector", or allowing the police to "peer inside the house through binoculars with impunity" to describe activities that are not implicitly licensed by homeowners, which would be an offense under general law. The court concluded that bringing police dogs into house reflections for forensic exploration because incriminating evidence was an unreasonable search, no warrant.
After determining unreasonable searches based on property rights, the Court stated that it is not necessary to discuss whether privacy rights by Jardines are also involved.
Concurring opinion
However, Judge Kagan, who joins Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, extends the example of binoculars to further argue that both the property rights and the privacy rights are equally > involved:
Strangers come to the front door of your house carrying super-high powered binoculars. He did not knock or say hello. Instead, it stands on the porch and uses binoculars to peer through your window, into the furthest corner of your home.... Do your "visitors" enter unauthorized access to your property, exceeding the license you provide to members of the public...? Yes he does. And does he also invade "your wisdom hope about privacy"...? Yes, of course, he has done it too. The case is the case in all important matters. (excerpt removed)
The controller case that supports this position is Kyllo v. United States , the case previously discussed involving the use of thermal imaging devices. Referring to the drug-detection dog as a "super-sensitive instrument", he argues that, "[the dog that detects drugs is] for the poodle on the road because the high-powered binoculars are a plain piece of glass.like binoculars, dogs that detect drugs are devices specifically to find objects that are not visible (or bad smell). "No need to care that the device is" animal, not mineral ", rough or sophisticated, new or old technology, small or large. Where the device is not "publicly used in general," and used against home, it does not make sense to violate a person's "minimum privacy expectation".
Disagreements
Dissenting, Justice Alito, followed by Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, writes that the majority's decision is "based on the rule of alleged transgression that can not be found in the history of Anglo-American jurisprudence". Alito instead argues that under traditional law unauthorized entry, visitors (including police officers) are also not considered unauthorized entry if they "approach the door, stop long enough to see if someone is home, and (if not explicitly invited to stay longer), leave... a visitor who obeys these restrictions does not need to ring the doorbell, knock on the door, or try to talk to a resident. "In addition, an officer who tries to" knock and talk "might also" gather proof by other means than to speak.The officer may observe the items in the usual view and the smell of the smell coming from the house. " Alito also stated that detection dogs have been used for centuries, citing Scottish law 1318 which mentions its use, and then writes, "If carrying a sniffer dog to the front door of the house is a violation, one would expect at least one case to have arisen over the last 800 years But the Court did not find any. "
Alito also disagreed with the concontent opinion that analog detection dogs with thermal imaging devices comply with Kyllo v. United States in power. First, he argues that there should be no reasonable privacy expectation if the odor coming from within reaches beyond to an area where people can legitimately stand. Second, unlike the thermal imaging device, it states that a dog, "is not a new form of 'technology' or 'device', and, as noted, the use of the acute olfactory senses of dogs in law enforcement has been around for ages. Alito also noted that in the case of Kyllo police officers operate their thermal imaging devices while on public roads, and if the same standards apply to dogs, he is afraid that it will not be used to detect, for example, "explosives, or to a fugitive or kidnapped child," outside of the public sidewalk as well.
See also
- Detection Dog
- Police dog
- Florida v. Harris , No. 11-817, 568 A. ___ (2013)
- Rodriguez v. United States , No. 13-9972, 575 U.S. ___ (2015)
- United States v. Place , 462 U.S. 696 (1983)
- The City of Indianapolis v. Edmond , 531 U.S. 32 (2000)
- Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
- Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
- Kyllo v. United States , 533 U.S. 27 (2001)
- United States v. Karo , 468 AS 705 (1984)
References
External links
- Texts Florida v. Jardines , 569 US 1 (2013), Docket 11-564 is available from: Justlaw Ã, Ã, Justia Google Scholar US Supreme Court
- US. Supreme Court, Docket # 11-564, Proceedings and Orders
- SCOTUSBlog page for Florida v. Jardines
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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